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Abstract
Blockchains systems evolve in complex environments that mix classical patterns of faults (e.g
crash faults, transient faults, Byzantine faults, churn) with selfish, rational or irrational behaviors
typical to economical systems. In this paper we propose a game theoretical framework in order
to formally characterize the robustness of blockchains systems in terms of resilience to rational
deviations and immunity to Byzantine behaviors. Our framework includes necessary and sufficient
conditions for checking the immunity and resilience of games and a new technique for composing
games that preserves the robustness of individual games. We prove the practical interest of our
formal framework by characterizing the robustness of three different protocols popular in blockchain
systems: a HTLC-based payment scheme (a.k.a. Lightning Network), a side-chain protocol and a
cross-chain swap protocol.
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1 Introduction
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) allow sharing a ledger of transactions among multiple
users forming a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. DLTs characterized by a block architecture are
called “Blockchains”; transactions are stored in blocks that are chained to each other by means
of cryptographic methods, namely hash functions. Blockchain systems are the composition of
various protocolar building blocks enabling its users to transfer cryptoassets in a decentralized
manner. Beyond the traditional blockchain protocols that exist today [7, 12, 17], the literature
proposes other protocols that respectively define and regulate interactions outside the
blockchain (layer-2 protocols [10]) and between different blockchains (cross-chain protocols [9]).
Each of these protocols establishes the instructions that a user must follow in order to interact
with or through a blockchain.
In a Blockchain system, agents can be classified in three different categories accordingly
to [3]: (i) players who follow the prescribed protocol are called altruistic, (ii) those who
act in order to maximise their own benefit are said to be rational and, (iii) players who
may arbitrarily deviate from the prescribed protocol are defined as Byzantine. Moreover,
protocols can be classified in: Byzantine Altruistic Rational Tolerant (BART) protocols
that guarantee the safety and liveness properties in the presence of rational deviations and
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Incentive-Compatible Byzantine Fault Tolerant (IC-BFT) that incentivize rational agents to
follow the prescribed protocol, also in presence of Byzantine players.
In this context, game theory helps in designing IC-BFT protocols guaranteeing that
rational players follow the prescribed protocol’s instructions. Concerning layer-2 and cross-
chain protocols, game theoretical analysis are carried out by [4, 5, 6, 8]. More precisely, authors
in [4, 5] design IC-BFT off-chain channels. In [6, 8] authors adopt the Nash equilibrium
solution concept to respectively evaluate the stability of various network structures and the
stability of existing cross-chain swap protocols.
Our contribution. This paper presents a game theoretical framework to analyze the ro-
bustness of blockchains systems, in terms of resilience to rational deviations and immunity
to Byzantine behaviors; it is the first one, as of our knowledge, with respect to the current
state of the art. The closest work to ours was proposed in [2] where the authors introduce
the concept of mechanism (a pair game-prescribed strategy). In order to characterize the
robustness of a distributed system authors in [2] introduce the notions of k-resiliency and
t-immunity. In a k-resilient equilibrium there is no coalition of k players having an incentive
to simultaneously change strategy to get a better outcome. On the other hand, the concept
of t-immunity evaluates the risk of a set of t players to have a Byzantine behavior. The
property of t-immunity is often impossible to be satisfied by practical systems [1]. We thus
introduce the concept of t-weak-immunity. A mechanism is t-weak-immune if any altruistic
player receives no worse payoff than the initial state, no matter how any set of t players
deviate from the prescribed protocol. We further extend the framework in [2] by proving
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to be optimal resilient and t-weak-
immune. Moreover, we define a new operator for mechanism composition and prove that it
preserves the robustness properties of the individual games. In this way, we characterize the
robustness of complex protocols via the composition of simpler robust building blocks.
The effectiveness of our framework is demonstrated by its capability to capture the
robustness of various blockchain protocols. We studied (k, t)-robustness and (k, t)-weak-
robustness (i.e., optimal k-resilience and t-weak-immunity) of Lightning Network protocol [14],
a side-chain protocol [15] and the very first implementation of a cross-chain swap protocol
proposed in [13] and formalized in [11]. Our analysis spotted the weakness of the Lightning
Network protocol [14] to Byzantine behaviour. More precisely, the protocol’s strategy to close
a channel (i.e., an off-chain payment line) is neither weak immune nor immune. Thus, we
provide an alternative protocol (i.e., an alternative closing module) satisfying weak immunity.
The protocols regulating transactions in side-chains (i.e., secondary independent blockchain)
Table 1 Immunity and resilience properties for Lightning Network [14], the modified version with
a different closing module, a side-chain protocol [15] and a cross-chain swap protocol [11, 13].
Protocol Optimal Resilience Weak Immunity Immunity
Lightning Network [14] Yes No No
Closing module Yes No No
Other modules Yes Yes No
Modified Lightning Network Yes Yes No
Alternative closing module Yes Yes No
Other modules Yes Yes No
Side-chain (Platypus [15]) Yes Yes No
Cross-chain Swap [11, 13] Yes Yes No
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proposed in [15] is weak immune since players following the protocol never get negative utility
when all the other players act as adversaries. Composition of games is used to prove the weak
immunity of the cross-chain swap protocol proposed in [11, 13]. Each blockchain corresponds
to a game that is weak immune, thus the composition preserves the weak immunity. Our
results are reported in Table 1. The details can be found in [16].
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